Although contemplative states may be reached through IN I or

Although contemplative states may be reached through IN-I or EX-I methods, the overwhelming majority of neuroscience and clinical studies have focused on meditation (or meditative training) as a self-regulated or inward-driven practice (Bishop et al., 2004; Cahn and Polich, 2006; Lutz et al., 2008; Nash and Newberg, 2013). These studies provided important information about the neural substrate that underlies contemplation and the many benefits it can confer upon its practitioners, including improvements in cognitive performance, affective regulation and immunological response; greater sense of wellbeing; arginase inhibitor of anxiety, depression, and stress; increased motivation; elevation of pain thresholds; and growth/proliferation of neurons, among others (Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Carlson et al., 2001; Davidson, 2004; Grant et al., 2011; Holzel et al., 2011; Jacobs et al., 2011; Lazar et al., 2005; Lutz et al., 2008; Moore and Malinowski, 2009; Slagter et al., 2007; Thompson et al., 2011; Williams et al., 2001; Zeidan et al., 2015). However, these investigations tended to exclude arrays of experiences associated with the use of contemplation-inducing images, objects and environments. Neuroaesthetics and neurotheology, two recently developed neuroscience-based approaches also tend to side-step empirical investigations of EX-I contemplative states (Aaen-Stockdale, 2012; Di Dio and Vittorio, 2009; Kawabata and Zeki, 2004; Newberg and D’Aquili, 1998; Schjoedt, 2009). Even when architecture has been the center of neuroscientific investigation, research has been primarily limited to understanding neural substrates associated with wayfinding, the evaluative perception of beauty, or other non-contemplative responses (Eberhard, 2009a, 2009b; Mallgrave, 2010; Vartanian et al., 2015). Recent neuroscience efforts are beginning to consider the emotional and psychological impact of architecture (Fich et al., 2014; Ma et al., 2015; Robinson and Pallasmaa, 2015) whereas research in psychology documenting the restorative potential of contemplative environments is growing (Herzog et al., 2010; Ouellette et al., 2005) and phenomenological studies have pointed at an intriguing experiential link between buildings constructed to provoke experience and meditative states (Bermudez, 2009, 2011a, 2011b). These considerations prompted us to undertake an investigation of neural correlates of architecture-based contemplative experience. The strategic goal of this first pilot study was to probe this new field of inquiry so as to develop the rationale and conceptual framework for further scientific investigations. Specifically, our exploratory study used two architectural conditions. The Control condition comprised slides of buildings that were not designed to induce meditative responses (e.g., office, housing, shopping mall) whereas the Experimental condition included slides of buildings designed to foster contemplation (e.g., temple, church, courtyard). The samples of the latter were chosen amongst the top 10 most cited buildings reported to provoke profound experiential responses in a recent survey on the topic (Bermudez, 2009; Friston et al., 1995). Professional architects (with no previous meditation training) participated in the study, which was conducted under IRB approval at the institution where the research took place. Subjects were placed into the fMRI scanner and instructed to allow themselves to experience the images as if they were present in the space shown in them. Buildings were depicted through a succession of photos simulating an actual walk from outside to inside. Three questionnaires (one after each block and an exit interview) were used to collect phenomenological data. Here, we aim to document differences in brain-activated patterns and subjective states triggered by “contemplative” vs. “ordinary” buildings, not unlike the differences between meditative and regular mental states. Second, we hypothesized that architecture-induced contemplation might be differentially processed by brain regions that support our interactions with external reality (occipital, parietal, precentral, cerebellar regions, the insula), even though these regions may be disengaged under IN-I contemplative states. Third, since subjects would naturally (i.e., effortlessly) focus on strong and attractive external stimuli, we expected to observe significantly less need for self-regulation and executive attention and consequently much lesser degree of activation of the dorsolateral or dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) than is reported under previous studies of IN-I meditative states (Baron Short et al., 2010; Brefczynski-Lewis et al., 2007; Cahn and Polich, 2006; Holzel et al., 2007; Lazar et al., 2005; Shimomura et al., 2008). Lastly, like IN-I meditation, we expected that EX-I contemplation would significantly reduce internal dialogue (e.g., mind wandering), possibly disrupting the narrative self and its concomitant mental processes that are presumably supported by the Default Mode Network (Brewer et al., 2011; Farb et al., 2007; Tagini and Raffone, 2010).